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Abstract
This paper examines the perspectives of Russian gas exports to
Western Europe and the strategic options of the CIS gas transiting
countries, namely Ukraine and Belarus.The development of a new
transit corridor through Belarus (the Yamal-Europe pipeline), depriving
Ukraine of its former monopoly, has modiﬁed the situation profoundly.
The thrust of the paper is an analysis of the strategies that Ukraine and
Belarus may pursue in transiting Russian gas: non-cooperative duopoly,
cooperative duopoly, and individual or collective cooperation with Rus-
sia.Using a demand function for Western European gas imports from
Russia, we estimate prices and quantities for gas transit, the expected
proﬁts for Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and the resulting import prices
for Western Europe.The results indicate that Ukraine suﬀers a loss of
several hundred million USD annually from the market entry of Belarus,
Belarus has an incentive to increase its gas transit capacity to at least
56 billion cubic meters, and Russia’s proﬁts increase, in particular when
it unites its gas sector with Belarus and Ukraine, a strategy pursued by
Russia’s Gazprom presently.For Western Europe, all scenarios indicate
an increase in welfare through the new pipeline, but also an increasing
importance of gas imports from Russia.
∗ This paper is an output from a long-term policy advice program to the government of
Ukraine, and a research project on the restructuring of the energy sector in the former
Soviet Union; the theoretical analysis is based on the Master Thesis of Chollet (2001).
The authors are indebted to Katherina Dittmann, Viola Ehrenstein, Manfred Horn,
Wolfgang Pfaﬀenberger, Wolfram Schrettl for comments on this or on earlier versions.
Technical assistance: Wolfgang H¨ arle and Uta Kreibig.The usual disclaimer applies.
The paper also appears as TU WiWiDok discussion paper.
† EnerSys (Gesellschaft f¨ ur regenerative Energien mbH), Fl¨ oßerstraße 60/2, D-74321
Bietigheim-Bissingen (Germany). Email: chollet@enersys.nevag.de
‡ DIW Berlin (German Institute for Economic Research), K¨ onigin-Luise Str.5, D-14195
Berlin (Germany).E-mail: bmeinhart@diw. de
§ DIW Berlin.E-mail: chirschhausen@diw. de, German Group of Advisors to the Govern-
ment of Ukraine and TU Berlin University of Technology
¶ DIW Berlin.E-mail: popitz@diw. de, and German Group of Advisors to the Government
of Ukraine
11 Introduction
The West European dependence upon gas imports from the Soviet Union and,
since 1991, from Russia have been and continue to be a critical issue studied
both from an energy economic and from a geopolitical perspective. The politi-
cal and economic dependence of Western Europe upon gas imports from Russia
has been dealt with in the literature from the beginning of the ﬁrst long-term
contracts in the late 1970s (see Greer/Russel, 1982, Banks, 1983). The most
extensive quantitative analysis of interdependence in European East-West gas
trade was carried out by Grais/Zheng (1996) showing that an improved re-
liability of gas supply from Russia is beneﬁcial to the Russian gas exporting
industry, to the gas transiting countries and to the West European gas im-
porters. However, political and economic instability in Russia and in the main
transit country, Ukraine, have raised doubts on the reliability of supply, thus
containing the market share of Russian gas on the West European market.
The rules of the game have been changed signiﬁcantly by the completion in
late 1999 of a parallel gas pipeline allowing Russian gas exports via Belarus to
Poland and on to Germany, the so-called Yamal-Europe pipeline. In addition,
Russia and the West European gas industry are considering to construct a
”by-pass” pipeline from Belarus through Poland to Eastern Slovakia, in order
to circumvent the politically unstable Ukraine even further. Thus, the former
monolithic gas trade between Russia and Western Europe has become a multi-
player game with signiﬁcant eﬀects on strategies and potential outcomes.
In this paper, we analyze the perspectives of the Russian gas exports in
the light of potential pipeline development in Belarus and Ukraine. The mar-
ket entrance of Belarus gives rise to a duopolistic market structure which we
examine with respect to its eﬀects on transit fees and transit volumes, the
investments into new capacities, and the proﬁts of the three countries. The
paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 provides a survey of recent
developments in Russian gas exports and provides a qualitative analysis of the
planned pipeline project in Belarus. The core of the paper is the modeling and
subsequent quantiﬁcation of possible development scenarios in Section 3. We
run diﬀerent scenarios on the capacity- and price-decisions of Belarus, Ukraine,
and Russia, using four diﬀerent cases (cooperation and non-cooperation be-
tween the transit countries themselves, and between the transit countries and
Russia, respectively). Having approximated a demand function of Western
European gas imports from Russia, we can quantify the scenarios and attach
concrete ﬁgures for quantities, prices, and proﬁts for all players under diﬀerent
assumptions (Section 4). Finally Section 5 compares the results of the model
with recent political developments and discusses the potential repercussions
on Russia, the transit countries, and Western Europe.2 Recent Developments in Russian Gas Ex-
ports and Transits
2.1 Transit Problems with Ukraine
In spite of the political, economic and social upheaval of the post-Soviet trans-
formation crisis, the transit of Russian gas to Central and Western Europe
has continued, and even expanded, smoothly. This trend is strengthened by
the debate over the phasing out of nuclear energy in Europe, and the pos-
sible exhaustion of gas reserves in the North Sea. Russian gas exports to
non-CIS countries have increased from 107 bcm (1994) to 133 bcm (1999) and
the West European gas importers expect a further increase. However, until
very recently, the reliability of Russian exports was limited, amongst other
factors, by the political and economic instability in Ukraine, the monopolistic
transit country. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of
Ukraine made it possible for the latter to exercise monopolistic power in tran-
sit. Evidence for this is provided by the fact that Ukraine charges a transit fee
of about 0.88 − 1.09 USD/tcm/100km, whereas its marginal costs are about
0.15 − 0.24 USD/tcm/100km (Opitz, Hirschhausen, 2001, 155). In addition,
Ukraine was regularly accused by Russia of illegally withdrawing transit gas.1
Whereas few changes have occurred in the gas sector during the ﬁrst decade
of independence, the pressure on Ukraine to modify the functioning of its gas
transit activities is increasing.2 The rents from the gas transit business also
contributed to the general political climate of rentseeking, corruption, and to
the diﬃculty of separating state and economy and introducing eﬃcient corpo-
rate governance in Ukraine. All in all, political instability in Ukraine added
credibility to scenarios in which, as happened in October 1992, Ukraine might
be unable or unwilling to transit Russian gas to Central and Western Europe.
1 In 2000, Gazprom estimated the gas theft by NaftogazUkrainy at 15 bcm this year (Info-
dienst 44/2000, 17); in contrast to this NaftogazUkrainy admitted an illegal withdrawal
of gas of only one bcm for which it wanted to reimburse Gazprom.
2 For example, the issue of Ukrainian debt towards Russia stemming from unpaid energy
bills is increasingly challenging the country’s independence, and thus the gas sector’s
independence.As of late-2001, unpaid bills to Russia have cumulated to 1. 4 bn.USD.
Russia is intensifying its lobbying eﬀorts towards debt-equity deals, seeking ownership of
the transit pipeline and the two underground storage facilities.Also, the technical state
of the pipeline is critical.Indeed the under-investment of the last ten years is bearing its
fruits, be it increasing compressor fuel consumption, or corrosion problems.Estimates
of investment requirements for the transit system alone vary between 0.5-2 bn. USD.
32.2 Alternatives for Gas Transit
Since the early 1990s, diﬀerent options were discussed to contain the monop-
olistic power of Ukraine over gas transit to Western Europe. However, it took
until the late 1990s for Russia, Belarus, and the West European gas importing
industry have taken concrete action in creating alternative transit capacity to
meet additional demand on the West European market, and at the same time
to weaken the monopoly power of Ukraine (see Figure 1 in annex):
- New capacities to transit large amounts of gas through Belarus and
Poland were built within the framework of the ”Yamal-Europe” pipeline.
Initially conceived to transport gas from the Yamal peninsula to Western
Europe, the Yamal-Europe pipeline is now used as a transit pipeline for
gas from Western Siberia that transits through Belarus (Minsk - Nesvizh)
and Poland (Kondratki - Wloclawek) to Germany (Frankfurt/Oder, Mall-
now). The connection of the ﬁrst 56” trunk was completed in November
1999, with a nominal capacity of 28 bcm, to which a second (and third)
line could be added to carry the capacity to 56 bcm (84 bcm, respec-
tively);
- The next step to circumvent Ukraine is the project of the so-called Yamal-
2 pipeline connecting Kondratki (Poland) to Velke Kapuzany (Slovakia),
with a projected capacity of 60 bcm. This would allow the Western
importers to use the Central corridor (with its high capacity and conve-
nient connections to West European markets) while still not depending
entirely upon Ukraine for transit. Yamal-2 has attracted signiﬁcant in-
terest by West European gas importers (e.g. Ruhrgas, Wingas, Gaz de
France, Shell) who are ready to participate in the ﬁnancing of this ap-
proximately 1 bn. USD project.
Whereas the proﬁtability of the second alternative, the so-called bypass, is
yet to be proven, a simpliﬁed ﬁnancial analysis of the Yamal-Europe pipeline,
shows it to be highly proﬁtable, even when considering the risks. For the
Belarus pipeline project, two major risks have to be considered:
- Political risk, i.e. the fact that the Belarus government may sequestrate
a part or all of the proﬁts from the pipeline business from the investor.
- Transit price risk, which reﬂects the fact that additional capacity may
reduce the transit price.
4A cash-ﬂow analysis shows that the project is highly proﬁtable.3 Given a
project life of 30 years, the Belarus investment project reaches a net present
value of nearly 3 bn. USD, which corresponds to an internal rate of interest
of approximately 20% (aasuming a transit price of 0.80 USD/tcm/100km.)
An analysis of the investment project as a real option shows that for most
probability distributions, investors are better of investing immediately instead
of waiting one or more periods.4 The following section describes the diﬀerent
opportunities for the three parties - Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus - with regard
to their activities in the future.
See annex
Figure 1: Transit pipeline system between Russia and Western Europe
3 Modeling the Three Players Export-Transit
Game
3.1 Four possible constellations between Russia, Ukraine,
and Belarus
In this section, we sketch out the possible constellations that can arise among
the three key players in the export-transit game, i.e. Russia, Ukraine, and Be-
larus.5 We distinguish between four types of coalitions, within which diﬀerent
price-setting mechanisms can be applied. The four constellations are:
3 We made the following assumptions: transit volume (ﬁrst stage): 28 bcm; pipeline con-
struction costs for 1200 km pipeline: 1200 mn.USD; basis costs for 3 compressor stations:
60 mn.USD; unit costs per aggregate in 2 compressor station: 36 mn.USD; pipeline
ﬁxed costs: 0.5% of construction costs; compressor ﬁxed costs: 3% of construction costs;
variable costs: 1% of the gas price; construction time horizon: 2 years; credit period: 10
years; grace period: 2 years; USD annual inﬂation rate: 2%; interest rate: 16%.
4 For our investment analysis according to the Dixit/ Pindyck (1994) real option approach,
we estimated the future transit price development in the following way: with a probability
of 40% the transit fee will be constant, with a 10% probability the transit fee will rise
on 1.20 USD/tcm/100km and hence, with 50% will fall to 0.80 USD/tcm/100km; the
political risk was captured by the probability of 15 % that the government will take 50% of
the transit gains which the new pipeline yields, and a 5% likelihood that the government
sequestrate all the yields by 100%.The full calculations of the cash-ﬂow analysis and the
real option analysis are available from Berit Meinhart upon request.
5 We consider the other transit countries to Western Europe (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia,
Czech Republic) as already being part of the enlarged Europe, and do not model their
behavior speciﬁcally.
5Transit Monopoly (point of inception) Russia-Ukraine, non-integrated.
This situation prevailed in the sector until recently. Ukraine is the transit
monopolist; as an independent player (i.e. not vertically integrated with the
Russian gas industry), it charges a monopolistic transit fee;
Transit Duopoly Russia-Ukraine-Belarus, no integration. In that constel-
lation, Ukraine and Belarus form a transit duopoly. We assume that both
players know the West European demand function for Russian gas. In the
short-term, with given capacities, each one has to decide upon the proﬁt-
maximizing transit fee; in the long-term, they have to decide upon capacities
as well. Russia as the gas exporter has to ﬁx the proﬁt-optimizing price, in-
cluding transit charges, that it oﬀers to West European gas wholesalers.
Within this constellation II, four situations are conceivable for the duopolists
Ukraine and Belarus:
-Π c cartel: Ukraine and Belarus decide to form a coalition against Russia,
and thus charge a monopolistic price pm;
-Π R1R2 describe a restricted competition situation, where one of the play-
ers supplies the market with its whole capacity, while the other ﬁrm de-
mands monopolistic prices for the residual quantity (assuming the quan-
tity of the ﬁrst player is capped). We deﬁne R1 as the strategy where
Ukraine charges the monopolistic fee for the residual quantity, and R2
describes the reverse situation where Ukraine uses its full capacity and
Belarus charges monopolistic prices for the residual capacity.6 In the
present situation, R1 is more likely, as the Belarus capacity is limited
(28 bcm), and Ukraine can charge a monopolistic fee on the residual
quantity.7 The inverse situation, where Belarus charges a monopolistic
fee and Ukraine uses its full capacity, is unlikely for the time being (as
it requires that Belarus has higher transit capacities than Ukraine);
-Π cap full capacity utilization, is the traditional non-cooperative price
competition, where Ukraine and Belarus undercut each other’s price un-
til both have fully used their respective capacities. The emerging price
6 Theoretically, R1 and R2 are not necessarily stable equilibria, as the supplier of the resid-
ual capacity may have an incentive to undercut the price of the competitor marginally,
and thus make a larger proﬁt; this may lead to a downward-spiraling price competition.
However, we assume that R1 and R2are stable.
7 This scenario suggests that Russia has an incentive to support capacity creation in Be-
larus to reduce the dependence upon Ukraine.
6depends upon the total available capacity and the elasticity of West Eu-
ropean gas demand.
Restricted Transit Monopoly (”Northern coalition”) Ukraine vs. Be-
larus and Russia, the latter forming a coalition: Russia and Belarus integrate
the gas production and gas transit, and thus apply marginal cost pricing for
the Belarussian transit; Ukraine only transits the residual quantity at a mo-
nopolistic price. Given recent political proximity between Russia and Belarus,
constellation III seems a plausible scenario for further pipeline extensions.
Cartel (”Slavic cartel”) coalition between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.
Last but not least, one has to examine the cartel situation where Russia joins its
production with the transit activities in both Ukraine and Belarus, and where
this trio optimizes the total proﬁt as an oligopolistic gas supplier to Western
Europe. Again, this coalition would apply marginal-cost pricing internally, and
thus obtain a lower price and a higher share on the West European gas market.
In order to incite Ukraine and Belarus to renounce to their monopolistic transit
fees, Russia would have to commit itself to a proﬁt sharing with Ukraine and
Belarus.
3.2 The Modeling
Due to the fact that the transit fee setting decision is inﬂuenced by the expected
sale and that the production decision depends on both transit and sale, we
shape the three players game in our analysis in a reverse chronological order:




- restricted transit duopoly (R1,R 2)a n d
- transit cartel
We reduce the quantitative analysis of gas sales to the three most important
markets for Russian gas: Germany, France and Italy.8 Together these three
countries account for almost 100% of West European gas imports from Russia.
8 See Chollet (2001), p.12
73.2.1 Transit Monopoly
Modeling the transit monopoly situation we can assume that player UKR has
certainty about sales quantity. Therefore, the decision for the transit fee is
economically unequivocally determined.
Ukraine acts in a proﬁt maximizing way by setting the transit fee:
Πukr = τukr · x (1)
τukr = pukr − prus − cukr (2)
with τukr as transit charge and x as sold quantity. The transit charge τukr can
be written as the selling price at the West European border pukr minus the
Russian sales price at the Ukrainian border prus minus the Ukrainian transit
costs. We assume a linear demand function for Russian gas in Western Europe
(that will be quantiﬁed later on):
p = a · x + b (3)
Then we can write the Ukrainian proﬁt as:
Πukr =( a · x + b − prus − cukr) · x (4)
Maximizing the proﬁt of Ukraine
∂Πukr
∂x
=2 ax + b − prus − cukr




(prus + cukr − b) | x ≤ Cukr (6)
with Cukr designating the Ukrainian transit capacity.
The behavior of Russian as a proﬁt maximizer can be modeled as follows:
Πrus =( prus − crus) · x (7)




(prus − crus) · (prus + cukr − b). (8)
Thus, Russia’s proﬁt only depends on the parameter prus. Setting the ﬁrst






(2prus − crus + cukr − b)




(b + crus − cukr) (10)
8and for the price at the Western Europe boarder:
pukr = a · x + b =
1
4
(crus + cukr +3 b) (11)
3.2.2 Transit Duopoly
In case of the transit duopoly three actors are involved in the game: Russia
(RUS), Belarus (BEL), and Ukraine (UKR). Knowing the West European
linear demand function the two transit players UKR and BEL have to take
the decision about their transit fee. Player RUS has to decide about the sales
price at the Western Europe border anticipating the transit fee decision by
BEL and UKR.
Hence follows a strategy room with four possible solutions:
a) the Bertrand competition price pb;
b) the restricted capacity price pcap;
c) the collusion price pcoll (upper limit) and;
d) the prices arising from a restricted price competition (pR1,,p R2).
a) Marginal cost price (competition C) In the case the marginal costs
for both players are diﬀerent, the marginal cost price will be set slightly below
the level of the higher marginal costs. The player with the smaller marginal
costs has no incentive to reduce the price further, since the competitor is not
yet making a proﬁt.
pb = max

prus + cukr −  
prus + cbel −   (12)
b) Capacity price (pcap) The capacity price results from the maximum
exhausted capacities Cbel and Cukr:
pcap = a · (Cbel + Cukr)+b (13)
9c) Monopoly price (collusion pcoll) In case of collusion both players BEL
and UKR act jointly as one proﬁt maximizer. Assuming that the operating
costs plus the price at the Western Europe border (ci + prus) are diﬀerent
for both players, two possible quantities xmon arise depending on the players’
capacities:
Πi = τi · x
i
mon
=( p − (prus + ci)) · x
i
mon
=( a · x
i
mon + b − (prus + ci)) · x
i
mon (14)
Maximizing the proﬁt by setting the ﬁrst derivative to zero we get:
∂Π
∂xi
mon =2 a · xi




2a(prus + ci − b)
(15)
To identify the monopoly price we assume that as long as capabilities are not
binding, the data of the player with the smaller

ci +prus will be used.9 The
developed total sales quantity xmon will be distributed at the rate of the players
capacities, such that the following single selling quantities arise:




| xi ≤ Ci (16)
Respectively the resulting price is:
pmon = a · xmon + b (17)
d) Restricted competition price (restricted competition R1,R2) In
the case of restricted competition, one player is confronted with a shortened
market by the capacity of the other player. Since both cases R1,R2 are sym-
metric, we choose the case Ri that reﬂects the player i using its total capacity,
and player -i behaving like a proﬁt maximizing monopolist on the residual
market.
The demand function for player -i can be written as:
p−i = a · (x−i + Ci)+b (18)
and yields to the proﬁt maximizing quantity:
9 Choosing the maximum of both quantities xi




10Π−i =( p−i − prus − c−i) · x−i
=( a · (x−i + Ci)+b − prus − c−i) · x−i (19)
∂Π−i
∂x−i
=2 a · x−i + a · Ci + b − prus − c−i
! = 0 (20)




b − prus − c−i
2a
(21)
The quantity xi will by deﬁnition be set to:
xi = Ci (22)
Hence the following price results:











b − prus − c−i
2
(23)
3.2.3 The Restricted Transit Duopoly
The restricted transit monopoly reﬂects the situation that player RUS and
BEL build a cooperation and act like one player. In this case only two actors
dominate the game: RUSBEL as producers with their own export capacities
and UKR as a pure transit player.
Starting from the following proﬁt function:
Πukr =( a · (xukr + xbel)+b − cukr − prus) · xukr (24)
we can compute Ukrainian quantity, given the quantity xbel and the price prus:
∂Πukr
∂xukr





(prus + cukr − axbel − b) (25)
RUSBEL will use the information on Ukraine’s quantity in order to maximize
its own proﬁt:
Πrusbel =( prus − crus) · (xbel + xukr)+( p − cbel − prus) · xbel (26)
11The selling price at the Western Europe border p is included in equation 2 for
the Belarus route by the transit fee τbel (τbel = 0, because RUSBEL does not
levy a transit fee on its own transit), the Russian selling price prus,a n dt h e
Belarus transit costs cbel. Therefore we can simplify equation 26 as:
Πrusbel =( p − cbel − crus) · xbel +( prus − crus) · xukr (27)
Substituting xukr from 25 into 27, the proﬁt of RUSBEL depends only on the
two variables, xbel and prus:
Πrusbel =( axbel +
1
2




(prus − crus) · (prus + cukr − axbel − b) (28)
By diﬀerentiating equation 28 we can show that both variables depend only
on the exogeneously given parameters:
∂Πrusbel
∂xbel
= axbel + cukr −
b
2
− crus − cbel





























(2cukr − crus − cbel − b) (33)
But Belarus’ transit quantity computed by equation 30 could exceed its ca-
pacity Cbel. In this case we substitute xbel in equation 25 with Cbel and get
RUSBEL’s proﬁt:
12Πrusbel =( aCbel +
1
2




(prus − crus) · (prus + cukr − aCbel − b) (34)
The only variable value in equation 34 is RUSBEL’s price prus. Thus RUSBEL






(2prus + cukr − crus − b)




(crus − cukr + b) (36)
3.2.4 Transit Cartel
Within the transit cartel all three players act together as one player and op-
timize the proﬁts of this one player. The diﬀerence with respect to the single
monopoly case is that two alternative export routes now exist, which can be
combined. As long as the marginal costs are identical, the optimal price will
be determined by the marginal costs equal to marginal revenues. In case of
diﬀerent transit costs on the two routes (cbel  = cukr), we get two constant but
diﬀerent marginal costs (cbel+crus resp. cukr+crus ). Hence, the linear demand
function can be written as:
∂Πcartel
∂x
=2 ax + b = cbel + crus ∨ cukr + crus (37)
Without any capacity restrictions, only the pipeline with the lower marginal
costs would be used. In the case that the optional export quantity exceeds
the capacity of the lower cost pipeline, the new optimal export quantity will
be determined by equalizing the marginal revenues and the higher marginal
costs.
4 Data Analysis and Results
The analysis of the three player game described in the last section is based
on the assumption of a linear demand function for Russian gas. 10 Thus the
10 This is a strict simpliﬁcation, but necessary for computing results.We neglect the reac-
tions of other gas exporting countries (Netherlands, Norway, Algeria) on price changes
13demand function for Russian gas at the West European border depends only
on two parameters:
p = a · x + b (38)
The parameters a,b used in this paper are calculated using a simpliﬁed version
of the model of Golombek u.a. (1995): Parameter a = −0.1812 USD
tcm·109cm and
parameter b =5 8 .9122USD.11
The Ukrainian transit capacities (Belarus, Progres, and Sojuz) total ap-
proximately 110 bcm per year. In 1999 some 60 bcm of gas were transited
to Western Europe, and some 40 bcm to Central Europe. Together with ex-
ports to countries in the South-East of Europe the utilization rate of these
pipelines is near 100%. 12 We assume that Central European countries require
a constant capacity of 40 bcm. Thus the maximum transit capacity of the
Ukrainian system for transit to Western Europe is 70 bcm. The capacity of
the Yamal-Pipeline via Belarus and Poland is taken as 28 bcm per year during
the ﬁrst stage. It is planned that capacity be expanded to a total of 56 bcm
in the second stage. Hence, we have two capacities for the Belarussian route.
Cbel,1 =2 8b c ma n dCbel,2 =5 6b c m .
Transport costs Transport costs for Belarus and Ukraine are taken from
Golombek et al. (1995). It is important that only variable costs are taken
into account for short-term supply. The transport costs are thus computed as
cbel =5 .865USD
tcm and cukr =1 1 .73USD
tcm .13
of Russian export gas.Thus, the price elasticity of demand for Russian gas might be
overestimated.It is planned to extend the present model in order to better model the
West European gas imports.
11 Chollet (2001, pp.27 sq. ) contains a detailed computation of parameters a,b.In essence,
Golombek et al.(1995) provide a functional form of the demand curve, using various
technical parameters.The coeﬃcients a and b of the West European demand curve are
obtained as best choices from a regression, using diﬀerent intervals in the demand curve
(up to 100 bcm).We acknowledge that this is quite a rough estimate, however, given
substantial data constraints, it is the best one available.
12 Opitz/Hirschhausen (2000)
13 Golombek et al.(1995) have stated the following formula for variable transport costs for







However, it is known that the new Belarussian pipeline is technically more eﬃcient than
the old Ukrainian one, which is notoriously outdated, leaky, and has high operation costs.
Thus we take the Golombek et al.formula as an average and add 10% for the Ukrainian
14Production costs Production costs for Russia are derived from the transit
monopoly model. We can ﬁnd a dependency between price pukr and quantity
x (cf. equation 11) that must be valid for 1998 when the transit monopoly
was still untouched. With given Ukrainian transport costs we get production
costs for RUS:
crus =4· pukr − 3 · b − cukr (39)
Thus, crus =6 .21USD
tcm . This corresponds quite closely with estimates from gas
sector specialists, varying between 3 − 8USD
tcm .
Table 1 shows the results from the simulation analysis for the four strategies
(transit monopoly, transit duopoly, restricted transit duopoly, and cartel case);
we calculate prices, quantities, and proﬁts for diﬀerent transit capacities of the
market entrant Belarus (28 bcm and 56 bcm, respectivly).14
Prices One important result arising from the simulation analysis is that
Western Europe will beneﬁt from the market entry of Belarus, due to the rising
quantity supplied by Russia at lower prices. The sales price of Russian gas at
the Western European border decreases from the former Ukrainian transit
monopoly situation (pukr =4 8 .3 USD/tcm), down to the transit duopoly case
(pukr =4 7 .6 USD/tcm) and to the restricted transit duopoly case, where
pukr =4 6 .2 USD/tcm; ﬁnally, in the case of the cartel between Russia, Ukraine,
and Belarus, the sale price falls even further to pukr =4 1 .2 USD/tcm; this













We simplify and deﬁne the Ukrainian transport lenght as lukr = 2000km (i.e. Rus-
sian/Ukrainian border to Western Europe); then Ukrainian transport costs are:






With a further simpliﬁcation, we set lbel = 1200km (i.e. Russia/Belarus border to







14 Unless stated diﬀerently, the following results are valid for Belarus transit capacities of
28 bcm; the nature of the results can be transposed to the case of 56 bcm.
15price results from a proﬁt maximization of all three players (Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus) jointly, whereas Russia has to compensate Ukraine and Belarus for
the lost transit proﬁts.
Inversely, the sale price of Russian gas to the transit countries increases
from the monopoly case (sale price at the Ukrainian border: prus =2 6 .6
USD/tcm), to the transit duopoly: Due to the emergence of an additional
transit route, Russia can increase its sale price at the Ukrainian and Belarus
border (to prus =2 9 .3 USD/tcm). The redescending of that price in the
restricted transit duopoly (prus =2 6 .6 USD/tcm) can be explained by the fact
that the Nortern coalition (Russia and Belaurs) faces no transit mark-up, and
that it can therefore oﬀer gas at a lower price to Western Europe; in order to
satisfy West European demand at the lower price, Russia sells to Ukraine at
a price that assures market clearing, while the Northern pipeline (28 bcm) is
fully used; hence, the residual Ukrainian quantity amounts xukr =4 3b c m .
Quantities According to our model, the described fall in sale price at the
West European border will lead to an increase in the export quantity.15 Rus-
sian gas exports to Western Europe increase from the monopoly case (60 bcm)
to 98 bcm in the cartel case. Therefore, Western Europe will increase its de-
pendence on Russian gas on the producer side, but diversify the risk on the
transit level by demanding Russian gas on two pipelines - the Belarus pipeline
and the Ukraine pipeline. The utilization of the Ukrainian transit network
falls to 45 bcm (in the case of the transit duopoly) or even to 43 bcm (in
the restricted transit duopoly, where Belarus uses its full capacity of 28 bcm).
Should Belarus expand its capacities to 56 bcm, the loss of transit volumes for
Ukraine is signiﬁcantly larger still (down to 29 bcm).16
Proﬁts In all case, Russia beneﬁts from the market entry of Belarus, and
Russian proﬁts increase with the degree of integration with the transiting coun-
tries. For Belarus, it is also proﬁtable to enter the market, but Belarus gets
a higher proﬁt by forming a coalition with Russia instead of playing together
with the Ukraine in the transit duopoly. The additional proﬁt of extending
the capacity from Cbel =2 8b c mt oCbel = 56 bcm is much lower in the transit
duopoly case (∆ = 46 mn. USD) then in the restricted transit duopoly game
15 Remember that we assumed no strategic behavior of the other exporting countries.
16 Note that our model is based on a relatively high price elasticity, which may be con-
tradictory to other studies; a price reduction of approximately 15% (from pukr =4 8 .3
USD/tcm to pukr =4 1 .2 USD/tcm) leads to an increase in the demanded quantity of
about 50%.
16(∆ = 514 mn. USD). One unexpected result that we shall call the Ukrainian
paradox is that, once Belarus has entered the market, Ukraine beneﬁts from
the Northern coalition between Russia and Belarus. In case of the restricted
transit duopoly Russia sets a lower sales price at the Ukrainian border as in
the transit duopoly, so that the proﬁt margin of Ukraine is higher in this case
(Πukr = 328 mn. USD, as compared to the transit duopoly game Πukr = 289
mn. USD), even though the quantity falls from xukr =4 5b c mt oxukr =4 3
bcm.
The RUSBEL coalition is beneﬁcial for both players. While the sum of the
individual proﬁts amounts 1682 mn. USD, the proﬁt of the coalition amounts
to 1825 mn. USD. Last but not least, the coalition of all three players (Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus) would still increase total proﬁts further, to Πcartel = 2439
mn. USD, compared to the sum of the individual proﬁts: Πrusbel+Πukr = 2153
mn. USD.
Table 1: Results of the data analysis
Strategy Price in Quantity in Proﬁt Π in Capacity
USD/tcm bcm in mn. USD bcm
Transit pukr =4 8 .3 xrus =6 0 Πrus = 1221 Cukr =7 0
Monopoly prus =2 6 .6 xukr =6 0 Πukr = 588
Transit pukr = pbel =4 7 .6 xrus =6 3 Πrus = 1461 Cbel =2 8
Duopoly prus =2 9 .3 xukr =4 5 Πukr = 289 Cukr =7 0
xbel =1 8 Πbel = 221
pukr = pbel =4 6 .2 xrus =7 1 Πrus = 1803 Cbel =5 6
prus =3 1 .7 xukr =3 9 Πukr = 104 Cukr =7 0
xbel =3 2 Πbel = 267
Restricted pukr = pbel =4 6 .2 xrus =7 1 Πrusbel = 1825 Cbel =2 8
Transit prus =2 6 .6 xukr =4 3 Πukr = 328 Cukr =7 0
Duopoly xbel =2 8
pukr = pbel =4 3 .4 xrus =8 5 Πrusbel = 2349 Cbel =5 6
xukr =2 9 Πukr = 147 Cukr =7 0
xbel =5 6
Cartel pcartel =4 1 .2 xcartel =9 8 Πcartel = 2439 Cbel =2 8
Cukr =7 0
pcartel =3 8 .3 xcartel = 114 Πcartel = 2644 Cbel =5 6
Cukr =7 0
175 Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed diﬀerent options for strategic positioning of the
world’s largest gas exporter, Russia, and the two key CIS gas transit countries,
Ukraine and Belarus. The issue is increasingly gaining in importance with
ﬁnishing of a second large trunk pipeline from Russia through Belarus, thus
opening a variety of strategic options among the three players. Simplifying
the West European demand function for Russian gas, it is possible to model
the export decision by Russia, taking into account the adaptive behaviour by
the transit countries. Thus, it becomes possible to attach concrete ﬁgures to
diﬀerent strategies, and evaluate the underlying political decisions in favour of
or against closer cooperation among the gas industries in Russia (Gazprom)
and its neighbouring countries.
The simulations indicate three winners and one looser emerging from the
new pipeline construction: Ukraine clearly loses from the the new constella-
tion, suﬀering from lower proﬁts in the range of several hundred million USD.
Since this result could have been anticipated, it is surprising that Ukraine
has not made more serious attempts to prevent Russia and Belarus from con-
structing the northern pipeline, e.g. through earlier reductions of the transit
fee. Among the winners, Russia expands both sales to Western Europe and
proﬁts signiﬁcantly, due to the end of the transit monopoly by Ukraine. These
additional proﬁts may explain why Russia was the driving force behind the
pipeline extension through Belarus.17 Belarus also stands to win from the
new situation: it obtains proﬁts from the transit activity of several hundred
million USD. According to our calculations, Belarus has strong incentives to in-
crease its transit capacities from the present 28 bcm to 56 bcm, and eventually
even beyond that, if the West European market can absorb these quantities.
Belarus will particularly beneﬁt from a coalition with Russia, the restricted
transit duopoly. Last but not least, the Western European gas importers also
beneﬁt from the diversiﬁcation of Russian gas transit options. Gas imports
from Russia increase signiﬁcantly, from the estimated 60 bcm in the transit
monopoly, to 71 bcm in the restricted transit duopoly (with Belarus at 28 bcm
transit capacity) and even to 98 bcm in the cartel solution.
From a geopolitical perspective, what we have called the Northern coali-
tion, Russia and Belarus, seems to be the most probable outcome for the time
being. The partnership agreement and the economic union between Russia
and Belarus can to a large extent be explained by the proﬁts resulting from
17 Besides the directly quantiﬁable proﬁts, Russia also stands to gain from a soft fact, i.e.,
an increased feeling in Western Europe on gas imports from Russia.
18intensiﬁed cooperation in the gas (and oil) sector; in gas, this cooperation is
worth about USD 300 mn. per year. The big remaining question is whether
Ukraine will join the two other countries in forming a ”Slavic coalition”, and
thus establish a gas export cartel vis-` a-vis Western Europe. In purely economic
terms, the cartel solution is beneﬁcial to all three countries and to Western
Europe; but whether Ukraine will renounce on its political independence will
depend on the proﬁt-sharing agreement oﬀered by Russia.18 With the diver-
siﬁcation of transit routes to Western Europe, Russia has become a player in
its own rights on the European gas market.
18 Recent moves by Russia towards intensiﬁed cooperation with the Ukrainian gas industry,
including the nomination of ex-Gazprom Chief and Prime Minister Victor Tchernomyrdin
as ambassador to Ukraine, seem to indicate that Russia is seeking a wide cartel including
Ukraine.
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